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RACIAL AND ETHNIC PROFILING:
STATUTORY DISCRETION,
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES, AND
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY©
BY SUJIT CHOUDHRY & KENT ROACH'
Given the prominence of the issue of racial,
ethnic, and religious profiling in the public debate about
terrorism, it is significant that Canada's two legislative
responses to September 11 - the Anti-terrorism Act and
the proposed Public Safety Act - are silent on the issue,
neither explicitly authorizing profiling nor expressly
banning it. In this article, we focus on the constitutional
remedies available for profiling in the face of these
statutory silences, and the implication that the choice of
remedies holds for both remedial efficacy and
democratic accountability. Contrary to the position held
by the majority of the Supreme Court in Little Sisters v.
Canada, we argue that if profiling were to take place
pursuant to an exercise of statutory discretion, the
statute itself should be constitutionally challenged and
struck down because the infringement of the right to
equality is not "prescribed by law." The result would be
to force the issue of profiling back onto the legislative
and democratic agenda. By contrast, focusing the
challenge on the exercise of discretion would trigger
remedies under section 24 that would be largely
ineffective and retrospective, which would not trigger
democratic debate.
Etant donn6 ]a pr6pond6rance de la question du
profilage racial, ethnique et religieux dans le d bat
public sur le terrorisme, il est riv6lateur de constater
que les deux r6actions l6gislatives du Canada au 11
septembre - La Loi antiterrorisme et la proposition de
Loi sur la sicurit6 publique - ne disent mot sur la
question, n'autorisant pas plus explicitement le profilage
qu'elles ne l'interdisent. Dans cet article, et face A cc
silence du 16gislateur, nous nous int6ressons aux recours
constitutionnels possibles contre le profilage, ainsi
qu'aux implications qu'aura le choix de recours sur
l'efficacit6 corrective et sur ]a responsabilit6
d6mocratique. Contrairement A l'optique de la majorit6
des magistrats de la Cour Supreme dans I'affaire Little
Sisters contre le Canada, nous arguons que si le profilage
se produisait a la suite de l'exercice d'un pouvoir
discr6tionnaire fixd par la loi, cette loi m~me devrait
faire l'objet d'une objection constitutionneile et 6tre
abrog6e, car I'ali6nation du droit a l'6galitd n'est pas
"prescrite par la loi." Ainsi, la question du profilage
reviendrait de force sur le calendrier lgislatif et
d(mocratique. En revanche, se cantonner A faire
objection A l'exercice du pouvoir discrdtionnaire ne
ferait qu'occasionner des recours en vertu de 'article 24,
recours qui seraient largement inefficaces et
r6trospectifs, et ne susciteraient pas de veritable d6bat
d6mocratique.
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I. INTRODUCTION: EQUALITY IN THE FACE OF TERROR
It has often been said that the central challenge for liberal
democracies in the "war on terror" is how best to strike a balance between
the need to protect security and maintaining respect for the very freedoms
that that war seeks to defend. But just as history teaches us the chilling
lesson that freedom is often the first victim of war, it also reminds us that
equality is frequently an early casualty. Indeed, to a considerable extent, the
threats to equality and freedom are linked. Deprivations of liberty and
privacy, although felt to some extent by the populace as a whole, are often
distributed unevenly along lines of race, class, and religion. History
demonstrates a yawning gap between the rhetoric of common sacrifice and
solidarity and the lived experience of inequality on the ground. The forcible
internment of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War-an
indelible stain on the national conscience-is a tragic case in point.
Fortunately, the forcible internment of vast numbers of North
American residents is not on the agenda in the wake of the horrific events
of September 11, 2001. However, racial, religious, and ethnic profiling' has
entered into the jargon of some parties most supportive of the war on
terrorism. In brief, profiling is the use of race, religious, or ethnicity either
as the sole reason, or as one factor among many, in a decision to detain or
arrest an individual, or to subject an individual to further investigation.
Whether used as the sole factor, or one factor among many, profiling allows
race, religion, or ethnicity to play a determinative factor in investigative
I For the remainder of this article, "profiling" refers to racial, ethnic, and religious profiling.
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decisions. 2 Profiling likely contravenes section 15 of the Charter3 and faces
significant hurdles under the minimal impairment branch of the Oakes4 test
for section 1.5 This article focuses on a different issue: the constitutional
remedies available for profiling, and the implications that the choice of
remedies holds for both remedial efficacy and democratic accountability.
Given the prominence of profiling in public debate, it is stunning
that Canada's two legislative responses to September 11-Bill C-36, the
Anti-terrorism Act 6 and Bill C-17, the proposed Public Safety Act 7-are
absolutely silent on this issue. The bills neither explicitly authorize profiling
nor expressly ban it. Moreover, opportunities for clarification were
available but not seized upon. For example, during the debates surrounding
the enactment of Bill C-36, both the Special Senate Committee on Bill C-
36 and Liberal Member of Parliament and constitutional scholar Irwin
Cotler proposed that the bill be amended to include a non-discrimination
clause that would have had the effect of banning profiling.8 Unfortunately,
such a clause did not form part of the government's amendments.
Should profiling be held to violate a Charter right, the absence of
an explicit authorization of profiling in Bills C-36 and C-17 has important
legal implications with respect to possible attempts tojustify profiling under
section 1 of the Charter, as well as the remedies available should profiling
fail the test of justification. In broad strokes, there are two different tracks
available depending on the source of the constitutional violation-which we
term "track 1" and "track 2." The two tracks differ dramatically both in
terms of their remedial efficacy and their ability to enhance democratic
2 For a detailed definition of profiling that explains the different uses to which ethnicity and race
can be put in the investigative context, see Sujit Choudhry, "Protecting Equality in the Face of Terror:
Ethnic and Racial Profiling and s. 15 of the Charter" in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent
Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2001) 367 at 368-70.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charterl.
R. v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C.R. 103 [Oakes].
5 Charter, supra note 3, s. 1. The constitutionality of profiling is discussed in Choudhry, supm note 2.
6 S.C. 2001, c. 41 [Bill C-361.
7 Bill C-17, An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures for implementing the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in order to enhance public safety, 2nd Sess., 37th Parl., 2002
(2nd Reading 31 October 2002) [Bill C-17].
8 Irwin Cotler, "Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law
and Policy" in Daniels, Macklem & Roach, supra note 2, 111 at 119; Canada, Senate, Special Senate
Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, First Report (1 November 2001).
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accountability for constitutionally controversial policies.9
In cases where a right is violated by a "law" (legislation or
regulations), track 1 is the route that must be followed. The government
may first argue that the violation can be justified under section 1 of the
Charter. The threshold requirement that the limitation be "prescribed by
law" would be easily met if the law itself violates a constitutional right. The
heart of the section 1 analysis turns on whether that limitation is a
"reasonable limit that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society." If the law fails the test of justification, then a range of remedies
anchored in section 52(1) becomes available. These include declarations of
invalidity (perhaps subject to a period of delay), narrowing the scope of the
law through reading down, severance of the offending portion of the
legislation, a constitutional exemption, or extending the law through
reading-in or through severance. Although diverse, section 52(1) remedies
share one feature in common-they change the law that has been found to
be unconstitutional. Moreover, a section 52(1) remedy is usually not the
last word, because a full or partial declaration of invalidity quite frequently
prompts a legislative "reply."'
If profiling were explicitly authorized by Bills C-36 or C-17, track
1 would apply. However, since both pieces of legislation are silent on
profiling, if such practices were to take place, they would occur through the
exercise of law enforcement discretion, and would proceed down track 2.
Track 2 covers both unconstitutional decisions taken pursuant to a law that
itself raises no constitutional objections (for example, a law granting a
general discretion), as well as unconstitutional acts without any statutory or
common law basis (for example, an unauthorized warrantless search).
Although the latter type of unauthorized administrative act typically does
not allow the government a section 1 defence, the courts have held that
administrative acts taken under a general statutory discretion satisfy the
"prescribed by law" requirement of section 1. Should the violation
nonetheless fail the test of justification, the relevant remedial provision is
not section 52(1), but section 24. A broad range of remedies is available
9 This framework was first set out by Justice Lamer in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 [Slaight], and was subsequently applied by the Court in Ross v. New Brunswick
School District No. 15, [1996]1 S.C.R. 825 and Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1
S.C.R. 241.
Commentators agree that many cases declaring laws to be invalid result in legislative replies,
but disagree as to the exact number. See Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue
Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After
All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, "Six Degrees of
Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513; Peter W. Hogg &
Allison A. Thornton, "Reply to 'Six Degrees of Dialogue' (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529.
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under section 24, including the exclusion of evidence, stays of proceedings,
damages, declarations, and even injunctions in exceptional circumstances.
Section 24 remedies are generally designed to provide an appropriate and
just response to a past Charter violation. However, because these remedies
do not affect the law pursuant to which the unconstitutional decision has
been made, section 24 remedies do not generally prompt democratic
debate and legislative replies, unlike declarations of invalidity under section
52(1).
The choice between track 1 and track 2 flows from an initial
classification: whether the unjustifiable violation of the right can be
attributed to a law or to a decision taken pursuant to a law or outside of it.
The silence of Bills C-36 and C-17 on profiling suggests that track 2 should
apply. This position finds support in the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Little Sisters v. Canada." In that case, customs officials targeted materials
imported by a gay and lesbian bookstore on the grounds that those imports
were disproportionately likely to be obscene. In other words, customs
officials engaged in profiling, but on the basis of sexual orientation, as
opposed to race, ethnicity, or religion. A majority of the Court held that a
track 1, section 52(1) challenge to customs legislation was misdirected,
because profiling on the basis of sexual orientation was neither authorized
nor contemplated by the impugned legislation. Accordingly, track 2
applied, and the appropriate remedy was a section 24(1) declaration that
the applicant's rights to freedom of expression and equality had been
violated by customs officials.
In this article, we challenge this view. Our argument is that both
democratic accountability and remedial efficacy are better served by Justice
Iacobucci's dissent in Little Sisters, which concluded that the legislative
scheme itself must be struck down under section 52(1) because it failed to
take adequate measures to ensure respect for Charter rights that were
violated by exercises of statutory discretion. The democratic reasons for
preferring track 1 revolve around the need to promote public debate
regarding, and accountability for, the violation of Charter rights. The
Charter is best understood as a document that promotes dialogue between
courts and legislatures over the interpretation and application of the rights
protected in that document. Judicial review is a means whereby courts force
legislatures explicitly to state in legislation, via "clear statements," whether
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120
[Little Sisters]. For commentary, see Janine Benedet, "Little Sisters Book andArt Emporium v. Minister
of Justice: Sex Equality and the Attack on R v. Butler" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 187; Jo-Anne
Pickel, "Taking Big Brother to Court: Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of
Justice)" (2001) 59 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 349; Bruce Ryder, "The Little Sisters Case, Administrative
Censorship, and Obscenity Law" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 207.
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constitutional norms are to be departed from. 2 Under the Charter the
textual cue for legislative clear statements is the "prescribed by law"
requirement in section 1. The failure of Bills C-36 and C-17 expressly to
limit the equality rights of individuals of Middle Eastern appearance or the
Muslim faith who may be subject to profiling in the wake of September 11,
in our view, should mean that no profiling under these statutes could be
justified under section 1. If such a ruling were coupled with a declaration
of invalidity, the issue of profiling would be forced back on the legislative
and democratic agenda. We recognize that the availability of a declaration
of invalidity under section 52(1) in such circumstances is a matter of some
controversy and that courts could move directly to a more limited remedy
under section 24(1) of the Charter. Nevertheless, we will argue that there
are precedents in support of the more drastic, and in our view, more
democratic, remedy of a declaration of invalidity. By contrast, a section
24(1) remedy under track 2 would not prompt a legislative reconsideration
of the issue, because the law pursuant to which the decision was made
would not be at issue. While a section 24(1) remedy could play a valuable
and necessary role in providing some compensation for an aggrieved
individual, it would be unlikely to provoke sustained democratic debate on
the unconstitutional practice that prompted it.
Concerns regarding remedial efficacy turn on the limitations of
section 24 to provide adequate redress for victims of profiling. The
strongest remedies that are potentially available under section 24 (which
are far from guaranteed) are those that apply in cases in which profiling has
resulted in the discovery of incriminating evidence. It is only in this limited
category of cases that evidence can be excluded under section 24(2) or
proceedings stayed under section 24(1). By contrast, the completely
innocent victim of profiling will face significant obstacles in seeking relief.
The Canadian experience of awarding damages under section 24(1) is not
very promising, especially when severe consequential damage has not been
suffered. Moreover, few will commence expensive litigation against the
government if the prospect of damage awards is measured in the hundreds
or even thousands of dollars. To be sure, a victim of profiling may also be
motivated to seek a remedy that will help prevent others from suffering
from profiling. But again, the Canadian experience does not provide
grounds for optimism: courts have relied on general declarations, as
opposed to the large damage awards or injunctions sometimes used by
courts in the United States, to deter police from engaging in profiling.
Shifting profiling from track 2 to track 1 yields significant gains in
12 Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2001) [Roach, JudicialActivism].
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terms of democratic accountability, and sacrifices little in the way of
remedial efficacy. To permit profiling to remain on track 2 would create the
incentive for governments to "go underground" and implement many of
their constitutionally controversial measures through discretionary decision
making, out of sight of the democratic process. Indeed, the relative
inattention to the constitutional concerns raised by profiling, in sharp
contrast to the enormous public attention given to the overbreadth of the
definition of terrorist activities in Bill C-36, bears testimony to the impact
of the forms of public decision making on the content and quality of
democratic discourse. If governments wish to discriminate on the basis of
race and ethnicity, they should be prepared to justify that practice to the
Canadian public, even before they are required to do so to the courts.
II. SHIFTING EXERCISES OF STATUTORY DISCRETION
FROM TRACK 2 TO TRACK 1: THERENS AND
"PRESCRIBED BY LAW"
In the war on terrorism, discretionary powers take centre stage.
These powers fall into two categories. First, there are those powers created
by the legislative responses to the attacks of September 11. The most
notorious of these is the new investigative hearing provision inserted into
the Criminal Code3 by Bill C-36. 4 The new section 83.28 authorizes a
peace officer with the prior consent of the Attorney-General to request,
and a judge to order, individuals to attend a hearing at which they are
obliged to answer questions, even if those answers are self-incriminatory.
The key point to note is that the triggering event for a section 83.28 hearing
is replete with discretion, since section 83.28(2) provides that a peace
officer "may" request an investigative hearing. But the new discretionary
powers are not confined to the Criminal Code. The new Immigration Act 5
authorizes an immigration officer to make a warrantless arrest of any
foreign national, other than a refugee, if that person cannot establish his or
her identity to the satisfaction of the officer.16 Again, this power is
discretionary-the new section 55(2) provides that the officer "may," but
need not, order the arrest.
Second, although it is tempting to concentrate on controversial new
powers, there are existing powers that will play an important role in
13 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
14 Bill C-36, supra note 6, s. 4.
15 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [Immigration Act].
16Ibid., s. 55(2)(b), proclaimed in force 28 June 2002, C. Gaz. 2002.11.1637.
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investigating and preventing terror. Indeed, these provisions apply in
contexts where every individual must present himself or herself to a state
agent, thus making it much easier to select individuals for heightened
investigation. For example, the Aeronautics Act addresses airport security,
a central concern after September 11.17 Section 4.7 authorizes screening
officers to search persons and their belongings both before boarding
aircraft"8 and on board the aircraft. 9 The Aeronautics Act does not specify
circumstances under which searches can be conducted, other than to say the
search must be "authorized." Regulations made under theAeronauticsAct
20
simply provide that a search is authorized if it is "carried out by a screening
officer during the screening of persons and goods.",21 The absence of any
language requiring all passengers to be searched is the implicit
incorporation of a discretionary power. Advocates of profiling have also
suggested that profiling be employed at the border. Section 23 of the new
Immigration Act confers a discretion on immigration officers to refer a
person for secondary examination.22 This is not a new power; rather, the
same power was conferred by a nearly identical provision in the old
Immigration Act via section 12(3) (1) (a).23
Assuming that the discriminatory exercise of a discretionary
power-which is what profiling amounts to-contravenes section 15, the
next question is whether that decision could be upheld under section 1. The
principal issue is whether such a decision would meet the threshold
requirement in section 1 that limitations of Charter rights be "prescribed by
law," even before it is determined whether those limits meet the test of
proportionality. The "prescribed by law" requirement has been interpreted
to have two limbs. The first is that the limitation be made by law, which
imposes a requirement of form. The Supreme Court has adopted a rather
generous interpretation of this limb, holding that not only statutes, but also
regulations and even common law rules, count as laws that can, in principle,
justifiably limit Charter rights. What remains unresolved is whether internal
17 Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2 [Aeronautics Act]. Section 4.7 would be repealed by Bill
C-17, supra note 7, s. 5. Going forward, the screening of passengers would be addressed in regulations.
At the time of writing, draft regulations had not been released to the public.
18 Ibid. at s. 4.7(5).
Ibid. at s 4.7(6).
20 Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, S.O.R./2000-1 11.
2 1 Aeronautics Act, supra note 17 at s. 5.
22 Supra note 15.
23 Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, as rep. by Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C.
2001, c. 27.
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departmental directives which cannot be tied to a statutory anchor count
as law despite their lack of formal legal character.
Our focus is on the second limb-that a law of the appropriate form
actually prescribes the limitation in question.24 The principal question here
is the requisite degree of precision or explicitness that a law must have in
order to prescribe the limitation of Charter rights. The Court has adopted
a generous interpretation of this limb as well. After initially holding that
limitations on constitutional rights must be express or arise by necessary
implication in a law that limits a constitutional right,2' the Court later went
on to hold that broad grants of discretion that make no express or implicit
reference to even the possibility of rights-limiting activities are sufficiently
precise to satisfy section 1.26 Those grants of discretion are read down so as
to require that they be exercised in accordance with the Charter. It follows
that actions taken pursuant to a statutory discretion that on its face permits
violations of the Charter are capable of justification under section 1, unlike
legally unauthorized state conduct, which is not.
The case law has reached this position by following a tortured path.
In the law enforcement context, the leading cases on statutory discretions
and the "prescribed by law" requirement are R. v. Hufsky27 and R. v.
Ladouceur.28 Both cases concerned challenges to a provision of the Ontario
Highway TrafficAct that stipulates that a police officer "may" stop a driver,
if so doing is "in the lawful execution of his duties and responsibilities."29
The Court held in both cases that the provision violated the right against
arbitrary detention or arrest guaranteed by section 9 of the Charter, because
those stops constituted detentions, and the provision specified "no criteria
for the selection of the drivers to be stopped."30 In the Court's words, the
officer possessed "absolute discretion.",31 Hufsky involved a challenge to the
operation of that provision in the context of stationary spot checks;
Ladouceur involved a challenge to the provision in the context of random
spot checks. In both decisions, the section 1 analyses focused on the issue
24 For a useful discussion, see June M. Ross, "Applying the Charter to Discretionary Authority"
(1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 382.
R v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 [Therens].
26 Slaight, supra note 9.
27R v. Hufsky, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 [Hufsky].
28 R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 [Ladouceur].
29 R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, s. 189a, as am. by 1981, c. 72, s. 2.
30 Hufsky, supra note 27 at 633.
31 Ibid.
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of minimal impairment, with the Court finding that the section 9 violation
was justified. But the Court also found that the discretionary provision met
the "prescribed by law" requirement, even though the provision did not
explicitly authorize the random stopping of drivers, which had given rise to
the Charter breach. Nevertheless, in Hufsky, the Court simply stated that
the random stopping of drivers arose by necessary implication from the
legislation itself. This holding was cited by the majority in Ladouceur
(although the dissent declined to rule on the issue).
What is remarkable about these holdings is that they did not
attempt to grapple with the Court's earlier "prescribed by law"
jurisprudence. The seminal case is Therens, in which Justice Le Dain stated
that a "limit will be 'prescribed by law' ... if it is expressly provided for by
statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication" from the law that
limits the right.32 The accused in that case had been ordered by a police
officer to give a breathalyzer sample pursuant to the Criminal Code, and
had been denied his right to counsel in contravention of section 10(b) of
the Charter. Justice Le Dain (who was in the majority on this point) held
that the violation of the right was not "prescribed by law" because the
provision neither "expressly purport[ed] to limit the right to counsel," nor
did so by necessary implication.33 Of central importance was the possibility
in the Criminal Code for a two hour delay before the breathalyzer was
administered, and this, as opposed to a requirement that a roadside breath
test be supplied forthwith, would allow enough time for the detainee to
contact counsel. As a consequence, the violation of section 10(b) could not
be justified under section 1, and the case turned on the exclusion of
evidence under section 24(2).
In light of Therens, the question in Hufsky and Ladouceur was
whether the very terms of the statutory discretion precluded it from being
exercised in a manner that comported with section 9. And as the dissent in
Ladouceur suggested, this was not so, because it was open to the Court to
read down the discretion to incorporate a requirement that random stops
only be conducted at organized spot checks. It is noteworthy that Justice
Sopinka in his dissent (with the concurrence of Chief Justice Dickson and
Justices Wilson and La Forest) observed with some frustration that random
spot checks could be used in conjunction with racial profiling:
This case may be viewed as the last straw. ... The roving random stop would permit any
individual officer to stop any vehicle, at any time, at any place. The decision may be based
on any whim. Individual officers will have different reasons. Some may tend to stop younger
32 Supra note 25 at 645.
3 3 Ibid.
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drivers, others older cars, and so on. Indeed, as pointed out by Tarnopolsky J.A., racial
considerations may be a factor too. My colleague states that in such circumstances, a Charter
violation may be made out. If, however, no reason need be given nor is necessary, how will
we ever know? The officer need only say, "I stopped the vehicle because I have the right to
stop it for no reason. I am seeking unlicensed drivers." If there are bound to be instances
where admittedly Charter violations which cannot be justified will occur, can we overlook
these and approve a practice even if in its general application Charter breaches can be
justified?4
Unfortunately, the Court's relaxation of the "prescribed by law"
standard continued in other cases, most notably Slaight, which involved a
challenge to the order of a labour arbitrator on the basis of section 2(b).
Without any reference to earlier case law, Justice Lamer held (for the
Court on this point) that in challenges to exercises of discretion where a law
neither expressly nor implicitly limited constitutional rights, it would be the
individual decision, rather than the statute pursuant to which it was made,
that would be the focus of section 1. Although the judgment does not
squarely address the point, the proposition that emerges from it is that as
long as individual decisions can be traced to a statutory discretion, they
meet the "prescribed by law" requirement and indeed may be justified
under section 1 of the Charter. Any remedy for abuse of such discretion
would lie not through a track 1, section 52(1) remedy that would fix the
statute and likely provoke democratic debate, but through a more limited
track 2, section 24 remedy that would provide an appropriate and just
remedy for the particular violation. Although foreseeable because of the
unfettered discretion provided in the legislation, Charter violations would
be attributed to aberrational official conduct and not to the systemic flaws
of the discretionary legislative scheme.
This is where the Court's jurisprudence on "prescribed by law" and
statutory discretion rests. The implications for unconstitutional exercises
of discretion in the war on terror-for example, to profile passengers- are
clear. Individual exercises of discretion, as opposed to the statutes pursuant
to which discretionary decisions are made, could only be challenged under
section 24(1) of the Charter and not section 52(1), leaving the statutes
themselves immune from constitutional attack. But this resting point is
unstable not only because of Therens, but also because of cases from outside
the "prescribed by law" context that have attributed the unconstitutional
administration of a statute to that statute itself.35
In Hunter v. Southam,6 the Court found that searches carried out
3 4 Ladouceur, supra note 28 at 1264-67 [emphasis added].
35 These cases were cited by Justice Iacobucci in dissent in Little Sisters, supra note 11 at 1226-29.
36 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [Hunter].
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pursuant to federal competition legislation were unconstitutional.37
Notwithstanding the fact that the statute was capable of being administered
in compliance with the Charter, the Court unanimously attached the finding
of unconstitutionality to the statute itself, and struck it down. A similar
analysis was relied on by Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Beetz in R. v.
Morgentaler38 to find the abortion provisions of the Criminal Code3 9 to be
unconstitutional because of the considerable delay in access to abortions.
They arrived at this conclusion even though the extensive social science
evidence before the Court suggested that the source of delay was not just
the Code itself, but rather the failure of many hospitals to establish
therapeutic abortion committees, and the use by some committees of
quotas, all exercises of discretion which were not required by the Code.
Chief Justice Dickson actually cited Therens in support of this conclusion.0
The most recent example of this approach isR. v. Bain,4t in which the Court
(per Justices Cory and Stevens) accepted a constitutional challenge to the
Criminal Code provision on peremptory challenges by the Crown,42 even
though that discretion need not be exercised in a constitutional manner. To
be sure, the treatment of the "prescribed by law" requirement in these
three cases was confused. Because it was an early Charter judgment, Hunter
failed to mention it; in Bain, both Justices Cory and Stevens addressed
section 1 in a cursory fashion. In Morgentaler, both Chief Justice Dickson
and Justice Beetz appear to have assumed that the "prescribed by law" test
was met, which was correct given that the Code was partially at fault.
However, the point remains that in several cases, the unconstitutional
exercise of administrative discretion has been traced back to the statute
that confers the discretion itself.
We can make sense of these holdings if we closely examine Therens.
At the heart of that judgment lies a distinction between those violations of
rights whose pedigree can be traced back to a law, and those which can only
be traced to the decision of an agent of the state. Thus, Justice Lamer
(concurring on this point) stated that "the violation of the respondent's
rights is not the result of the operation of law but of the police action" and
37 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, ss. 10(1) and (3).
38 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [Morgentaler].
39 Supra note 13, s.251, as rep. by Ciminal Code, 1993, S.C. 1993, c. 28, s. 78.
40 Morgentaler, supra note 38 at 62.
41 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91 [Bain].
42 Supra note 13, s. 634(2).
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as such could not be justified under section 1.43 A later judgment, R. v.
Simmons, 4 relied on the same distinction-between those violations of
rights attributable to law and those attributable to the decisions of a state
agent-in the context of a discretion to conduct a search under the Customs
Act.45
Therens and the cases that have followed it offer an alternative
framework through which to analyze statutory discretion under section 1.
Unlike Slaight, Therens makes an institutional distinction between two
different kinds of governmental decisions that violate Charter rights: (a)
those whose pedigree can be directly traced to legislatures, and (b) those
that terminate in particular agents of the state. Although both (a) and (b)
fall within the ambit of Charter scrutiny under section 32, only the former
passes the threshold "prescribed by law" requirement under section 1 and
is capable of meeting the test of justification. The operative difference
between (a) and (b) is the existence of a legislative mandate (either explicit
or arising by necessary implication) for certain violations of constitutional
rights, which implies a conscious decision by the legislature to limit Charter
rights. Justice Sopinka made this point in his concurring judgment in R. v.
Hebert,46 where he drew a distinction between the actions of officials that
were "prescribed by law," and those that were simply "not proscribed by
law., 47 Although both actions were legal, only the former met the
requirements of section 1, because "[t]he word 'prescribe' connotes a
mandate for specific action, not merely permission for that which is not
prohibited."48 This more rigorous understanding of the "prescribed by law"
requirement under section 1 of the Charter is consistent with a democratic
model of judicial review with roots in the common law, which requires
legislatures to make clear statements before they will be allowed to infringe
constitutional rights.
Built into Therens' interpretation of the "prescribed by law"
requirement, then, is the appropriate allocation of institutional
responsibility with respect to decisions to violate Charter rights. By
emphasizing the importance of a mandate traceable to the decision of a
legislature, the "prescribed by law" requirement reflects the importance of
political accountability for decisions to breach the Charter. In other words,
43 Therens, supra note 25 at 623.
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 495.
45 R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 1.
46 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151.
4 7 Ibid. at 205.
48 Ibid. at 205.
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Therens, unlike Slaight, is premised upon a democratic rationale for the
"prescribed by law" requirement. This rationale has been lost in the Court's
subsequent jurisprudence.
The result has been a relaxed "prescribed by law" requirement that
arguably does not do justice to the values that underlie section 1 of the
Charter. In Oakes, the Court recognized the idea that "Canadian society is
to be free and democratic" was an important contextual element informing
the interpretation of section ." Chief Justice Dickson stated that "[tjhe
Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and
democratic society," which included "faith in social and political institutions
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society."5 A
relaxed "prescribed by law" requirement, which allows limits on Charter
rights to be enacted without clear legislative statements and consequent
opportunities for democratic debate and accountability, runs contrary to
the idea that democratic values must support limitations on Charter rights.
A relaxed "prescribed by law" requirement also offends the values
that underlie the "void for vagueness" doctrine under section 7, which the
Court has recognized should inform the interpretation of the "prescribed
by law" requirement under section 1. As articulated in the leading case of
R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, these common values include the
need to provide fair notice to the individual and to limit law enforcement
discretion.5" To this list we would add a third value: the promotion of
democratic accountability for limitations on Charter rights. Specificity or
explicitness promotes all three of these values. Moreover, it is possible to
give a democratic interpretation to both the need to provide fair notice and
the need to limit law enforcement discretion. Thus, the need to provide fair
notice is designed to ensure fairness to a potential accused, but it also
provides an opportunity for democratic debate and accountability as the
legislature notifies the citizenry of potential liability. And the need to limit
law enforcement discretion reflects the fact that the police and other state
officials are not as directly accountable as legislators. However, it is
important to understand how these three values are different. Inasmuch as
the Court's stated rationales for the "prescribed by law" requirement are
informed by a liberal conception of the rule of law that is primarily
concerned with protecting individuals from public power, they ignore the
fact that the Charter is very much part of a liberal democratic constitutional
49Supra note 4 at 136.
50 Ibid.
51[1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 [Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical] where Justice Gonthier recognized for the
Court that "the justifications invoked for the doctrine of vagueness under both s. 7 and s. 1 are
similar": ibid. at 631.
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order. Accordingly, a democratic conception of the rule of law should also
inform the interpretation of the Charter.
The idea that "prescribed by law" should be interpreted to promote
democratic accountability for limitations of constitutional rights fits into a
broader conception of judicial review under the Charter.52 Rather than
establishing a regime of judicial supremacy, like the American Bill of
Rights, or of legislative supremacy, the Charter gives both courts and
legislatures complementary but distinct roles in the protection of
constitutional rights and the balancing of those rights against important
social goals. The task of the courts is to bring attention to constitutional
interests that are vulnerable to being overlooked or downgraded in
democratic debate. Faced with an unfavourable court judgment,
legislatures can respond, either through section 1 or section 33.
Viewed through the lens of institutional dialogue, Therens' stance
on the "prescribed by law" requirement forces legislatures to be explicit
regarding their intentions to limit constitutional rights. The need for
legislative "clear statements" under section 1, in our view, has its roots in
a common law model of democratic constitutionalism and adherence to the
rule of law that is continued by and enriched under the Charter. At common
law, it is a rule of statutory interpretation to construe ambiguous statutory
language so as to preserve certain fundamental rights. What is required to
displace these rights is clear statutory language. A famous example is the
presumption of subjective fault for criminal cases established in R. v. Sault
Ste. Marie.53 Clear statement rules promote democratic accountability for
decisions to limit rights, because these rules require legislatures to
deliberate upon and make these decisions in public. The failure to
rigorously enforce clear statement rules-perhaps out of a misguided but
well-intentioned desire to defer to legislatures-undermines democracy
instead of honouring it, because it creates perverse incentives for
governments to avoid democratic accountability for controversial decisions
by implementing them not in public through legislative mandates, but
through less visible exercises of statutory discretion. As Justice Wilson put
it in McKinney v. University of Guelph, only instruments which "have
52 Our argument raises the question of whether common law rules, given their lack of democratic
pedigree, should be permitted to meet the "prescribed by law" requirement. Regulations also pose a
problem because of the limited role of legislative oversight in the formulation of regulations. Our
position is that, although legislation is preferable from a democratic standpoint, at least common law
rules and regulations with "clear statements" would publicly articulate the violation of a constitutional
right and would prevent "invisible" violations of Charter rights through internal department policies.
For a similar point, see Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One
of the Charter" (1988) 10 Supreme Court L.R. 469 at 477, n. 21.
53[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299.
20031
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
survived the rigours of the law-making process"54 suffice for section 1,
because governments were forced to defend their decisions to the public.
The potential for implementing policies through exercises of
discretion, and hence beyond the easy reach of parliamentary and public
scrutiny, is significant and should not be underestimated. Indeed, exercises
of discretion can be highly formalized, approximating what could be
achieved through legislation and regulations, but through sub-legal means
that escape democratic debate and accountability. The RIDE drunk driving
spot check program in Hufsky is one example. Another example is provided
in the Little Sisters decision, where the Court held that customs agents had
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by targeting their
enforcement efforts at homosexual erotic materials being imported by a
lesbian bookshop, while adopting a relatively lax attitude to the importation
of heterosexual materials by mainstream booksellers. A remarkable feature
of the factual record is that Customs Canada had been acting pursuant to
a departmental policy centred on the now infamous "Memorandum D9-1-
1," a document that purported to define what was "obscene" for the
purposes of the Customs Tariff," but which lacked any formal legal
character and was not publicly distributed. In the context of profiling, the
exercise of discretion could likewise be formalized through a variety of
means, ranging from internally distributed departmental memoranda to
informal word-of-mouth directives from superiors. None of these forms of
"law," however, would be debated and defended in the legislature or be
accessible in books of statutes or regulations.
In sum, we suggest that the Court should tighten its understanding
of the "prescribed by law" requirement. There are two strands of the
existing case law which support our proposal. The first are the "vagueness"
cases. To be "prescribed by law," the Court has held in many cases that
limitations on rights need not be absolutely precise, but that they must
contain an "intelligible standard" that both provides sufficient notice and
fetters or constrains discretion.56 Although some may despair at the Court's
reluctance to strike down laws as void for vagueness, the functional
concerns of this jurisprudence in providing fair notice and limiting law
enforcement discretion should be brought to bear on the "prescribed by
law" requirement, as contemplated by the Court in its leading vagueness
54 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 at 386 [McKnney].
55 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-41 (3d Supp.), Sch. VII, Code 9956(a), as rep. by Customs Tariff, S.C. 1997,
c. C-36, s. 213.
56 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; Osborne v. Canada (Treasuty Board), [1991] 2
S.C.R. 69. Also see Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 208 D.L.R. (4th)
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case. 57 There are some encouraging cases. In Committee for the
Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada," Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 held that
an absolute discretion did not satisfy the "prescribed by law" requirement
because it did not provide an intelligible standard. But the need for an
intelligible standard also reflects an allocation of institutional responsibility,
requiring the legislature expressly to provide standards to guide
administrative discretion. Our proposal builds on this, by requiring not just
an intelligible standard for administrative decision makers, but also an
express or necessarily implicit statement that rights-limiting activities may
be undertaken.
The second strand of case law is the requirement of form, again
under section 1. In Therens, the list of varieties of law that count as "law"
share one common feature- they are all accessible to the public, albeit to
differing degrees. By contrast, internal departmental policies, even those
that are sufficiently formal to be nearly identical to laws, but which are
generated pursuant to exercises of statutory discretion, are not. Although
the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on this issue (members of the
Court disagreed in Commonwealth), in Little Sisters the Attorney-General
of Canada conceded, and dissenting judges (but not dissenting on this
point) held, that Memorandum D9-1-1 did not constitute "law" for the
purposes of section 1. To hold that statutory discretions are sufficiently
precise to prescribe the limitation of constitutional rights would undermine
the demands of publicity and make nonsense of the requirement that rights
be limited by laws that are accessible to all.59
Finally, the need for clear statements in relation to profiling is
critical because of the difficulties of proving discrimination. In his dissent
in Ladouceur, Justice Sopinka suggested that the danger posed by an
unfettered discretion to stop motorists is the possibility that it could be
exercised in a discriminatory fashion on the basis of race. In response to the
view that individuals who suspected that they had been the victims of
discrimination could seek a section 24(1) remedy after the fact, Justice
Sopinka was candid, stating that a discriminatory exercise of discretion is
5 7 Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical, supra note 51.
58 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 [Commonwealth]
For the argument that departmental guidelines that have not been formally promulgated
should nonetheless count as "law" for the purposes of s. 1 under certain circumstances, see Lorne
Sossin & Charles Smith, "Hard Choices and Soft Law: Ethical Codes, Policy Guidelines and the Role
of the Courts in Regulating Government" 40 Alta. L. Rev. [forthcoming in 2003]; and Lorne Sossin,
"Discretion Unbound: Reconciling the Charter and Soft Law" (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: 20 Years Under the Charter Conference, Association for Canadian Studies, Ottawa, 19 April
2002) [unpublished].
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incredibly difficult to prove, because it is always possible to offer a
legitimate explanation afterward for that decision. By contrast, an explicit
policy either prohibiting or authorizing profiling in legislation enhances the
possibilities for political (and legal) accountability. Inasmuch as vulnerable
minorities lack the political power to secure a statutory ban on profiling or
to secure effective legislative oversight of the ability of officials to use their
discretion to engage in profiling, courts should interpret the "prescribed by
law" requirement narrowly-in the name of democracy-to correct for
those deficiencies in the legislative process.6"
III. SECTION 52(1) REMEDIES AND DEMOCRATIC
ACCOUNTABILITY
In the absence of a clear legislative statement authorizing profiling,
according to Therens, the statute pursuant to which profiling took place
would not be "prescribed by law" under section 1. A court would then move
immediately to the question of remedy without considering the question of
whether the statute satisfied the test of proportionality. A legislature that
refused to take responsibility for profiling would not be allowed to justify
law enforcement powers that permit profiling on the basis that the law
enforcement discretion could be exercised in a constitutional manner.
Here, the democratic advantages of track 1 and section 52(1) over track 2
and section 24 become evident. The case that vividly illustrates this point
is Little Sisters. In that case, the successful Charter applicants sought a
section 52(1), track 1 remedy that would have struck down the customs
legislation under which its shipments were seized. But a majority of the
Supreme Court found that such a remedy was inappropriate on the ground
that the disproportionate targeting of gay and lesbian erotica was not
caused by the legislation, but by the exercise of discretion by customs
officials under the legislation.61 In other words, because of Slaight, track 1
and section 52(1) were rendered inaccessible to the litigants. As a result,
they were shunted into track 2 and section 24(1). And because the
successful Charter applicant had not requested extensive injunctive relief
or damages under section 24(1), the only remedy was a declaration that
60 The importance of interpreting the Charter to protect the interests of the politically powerless
was made by Justice Wilson in Andrews v. Law Society of Bitish Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
61 Little Sisters, supra note 11. Ibid. at 1189, Justice Binnie concluded that "there is nothing on
the face of the Customs legislation, or in its necessary effects, which contemplates or encourages
differential treatment based on sexual orientation." He also stated, ibid. at 1168, that: "Parliament is
entitled to proceed on the basis that its enactments 'will be applied constitutionally' by the public
service."
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custom officials had violated the Charter in the past.
Justice Iacobucci dissented, on the ground that the declaration was
inadequate given the systemic nature of the Charter violation. He argued
that the "Court's precedents demand sufficient safeguards in the legislative
scheme itself to ensure that government action will not infringe
constitutional rights" 62 (although curiously, he did not cite Therens). One
would have expected, then, that he would have ordered injunctive relief
under section 24. Indeed, the case was a missed opportunity for ordering
and developing the legal framework surrounding structural remedies under
section 24(1). Justice Iacobucci's preference, however, was not for a
stronger section 24 remedy, but for a remedy under section 52(1)-a
declaration of invalidity. Unfortunately, what was absent in his reasons was
the rationale for his choice of section 52(1), particularly in light of Slaight.63
The best defence of Justice Iacobucci's dissent lies in the realization
that, unlike even the strongest section 24 remedies, striking down the
relevant customs legislation would have by necessity precipitated a dialogue
between the Court and Parliament, culminating in the adoption of new
legislation that would employ precautions to prevent the discriminatory
targeting of homosexual erotica by law enforcement officials. Little Sisters
illustrates that the choice between track 1 and track 2, and hence between
section 24 and section 52(1) remedies, is not simply a strategic one for
litigants. Rather, the choice of remedy has larger institutional dimensions
that speak to the liberal democratic nature of our constitutional system. A
section 52(1) remedy, as evidenced by Justice Iacobucci's dissent, is a
component of a democratic conception of the rule of law that is centred on
constitutional dialogue between the courts and legislatures. As with
Therens' interpretation of the "prescribed by law" requirement, the goal is
enhanced democratic accountability for limitations of rights, by forcing
governments to state publicly and defend decisions that collide with our
fundamental constitutional values. In other words, section 52(1) creates not
just a legal remedy for violations of constitutional rights, but a political
remedy as well. 64 It enables those without sufficient power to place issues
on the legislative agenda through political means via constitutional
62 Ibid. at 1225-26.
63 The majority relied on this precedent, ibid. at 1193.
64 We recognize that the section 52 remedy would have also been preferable from a rights-
protecting perspective. While section 24 remedies have usually been geared to providing compensation
for violations after they have occurred, the section 52 remedy contemplated by Justice Iacobucci in
Little Sisters is a remedial route that encourages the government to take precautions toprevent future
violations of the Charter. Although it is possible to craft section 24(1) remedies that aim to prevent
Charter violations in the future, there is little Canadian experience with such remedies.
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litigation. To the extent that profiling targets those without political power,
section 52(1) ensures that their concerns will be heard by legislatures.
What Justice Iacobucci failed to realize, unfortunately, is that track
1 and section 52(1) were unavailable to him because of the Slaight decision.
This oversight is a deeply puzzling aspect of his otherwise tightly argued
reasons, not the least because Justice Iacobucci devoted considerable
attention to the question of why it was the legislation itself, as opposed to
the decisions taken pursuant to it, that was the source of the
unconstitutional government conduct. As the majority correctly noted,
Slaight had settled this point in favour of the federal government, shunting
the case decisively off track 1, and away from section 52(1). Justice
Iacobucci attempted to overcome this doctrinal obstacle by attributing the
violation of Charter rights to the existence of a prior restraint of expressive
activity in the Customs Act. But even this line of argument only addressed
the systematic violation of section 2(b) in the case, and could not assist in
tracing the violation of the claimant's section 15 rights to the CustomsAct
itself, as opposed to Memorandum D9-1-1. To force the matter back on the
legislative agenda, Justice Iacobucci's only option was to confront and
overrule Slaight itself, which he did not do. Little Sisters accordingly
illustrates the interdependence between the appropriate remedy for
unjustified violations of constitutional rights and the prior question of the
threshold test for justifiable limits of constitutional rights under section 1.
It is important to be clear that there are a range of remedies
available under section 52(1), not all of which equally promote dialogue
and clear statements. 66 Reading-in, recently employed in R. v. Sharpe,67 and
severance result in courts essentially correcting the constitutional defects
in legislation without any need for subsequent legislative intervention or
public debate.6' A court that reads-in restrictions on profiling to legislation
that could possibly authorize such practices, for example, would be making
a strong statement that such practices could not be justified under the
65 For a similar point, see Pickel, supra note 11 at 358, and Ryder, supra note 11 at 227.
66 Conversely, some section 24(1) remedies such as the general declaration of constitutional
entitlement in Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, and Eldridge v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3
S.C.R. 624, may promote dialogue by allowing the government to select the precise means to
implement the entitlement. See generally Kent Roach, "Remedial Consensus and Dialogue Under the
Charter General Declarations and Delayed Declarations of Invalidity" (2002) 35 U.B.C. L. Rev. 211
[Roach, "Remedial Consensus and Dialogue"].
67[2001] 1 S.C.R. 45.
68 In this sense, constitutional minimalism, which avoids declarations of invalidity, may not
promote democratic dialogue between the courts and the legislatures to the same extent as a s. 52(1)
approach which results in a declaration of invalidity. See Roach, JudicialActivism, supra note 12 at 63-
65, 147-152.
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Charter, but would not necessarily prompt legislative intervention and
controls to prevent profiling. Parliament could, however, respond with new
legislation that specifically authorized and attempted to justify such
practices. However, it need not do so.
The section 52(1) remedy that most clearly promotes legislative
clear statements is the declaration of invalidity. Courts that found that a
provision in anti-terrorism legislation constituted an unjustified violation
of a Charter right could strike down the offending section. While
Parliament could respond to this remedy with new and better-tailored
legislation, the use of an immediate declaration of invalidity would raise
concerns that the government might be deprived of a valuable law
enforcement technique with which to combat terrorism. It is worth noting
that when Parliament decided to place five-year sunset provisions on two
of the most controversial parts of Bill C-36, the provisions for investigative
hearings and preventive arrests, it also took care to provide for some
transitional measures designed to ensure that ongoing investigations are
not disrupted by the possible expiry of the law.69 The transitional measures
suggest a public interest in the continued operation of the law. If a court
found a statutory discretion that had been used for profiling to be
unconstitutional, it would likely order a suspended or a delayed declaration
of invalidity that would allow the unconstitutional provision to remain in
force for a set and perhaps renewable period of time. Concerns about
threats to public safety that would be caused by an immediate declaration
of invalidity are a well-recognized reason for suspending a declaration of
invalidity. These concerns would only be amplified in the anti-terrorism
context. At the same time, a court should make clear that even during the
period of delay, the discretionary law enforcement powers should not be
used to engage in profiling, and that the court could provide remedies
during this period.7"
A delayed declaration of invalidity does not require the legislature
to respond before the delay or suspension expires, but it often has that
effect. An invalidation of a significant part of any legislative provision
useful in combating terrorism would likely generate sustained debate about
the need for such a measure, and Parliament would be able to redraft
legislation that authorized a Charter violation in an attempt to ensure that
it would survive a section 1 review. The timing of the delayed declaration
69 Bill C-36, supra note 6 at s.83.33.
701R. v. Swain, [19911 1 S.C.R. 933 [Swain]; Schachterv. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 [Schachter].
71 In Bain, supra note 41 at 104, Justice Cory stated: "The suspended declaration does not leave
the defence without a remedy during the interim. The accused may always attempt to demonstrate that
there has been an abuse of the stand by provisions by the prosecution."
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of invalidity might also affect the quality of public and legislative debate.
The Court has not been consistent with respect to the period of delay, and
has authorized delays of six, twelve, and eighteen months, without stating
any principled basis for these variations. Another issue would be whether
the successful Charter applicant should be exempted from this period of
delay. In most criminal law cases, the successful applicant has been
exempted from the period of delay in order to ensure that he or she was not
prosecuted or convicted under an unconstitutional law. This exemption
may, however, cause some unfairness to other similarly situated individuals
who would not be similarly exempted.72
In sum, the possibilities for democratic dialogue are significant
under track 1. A robust "prescribed by law" requirement that incorporates
the need for clear statements promotes democratic debate and
accountability for the violation of Charter rights. And declarations of
invalidity under section 52(1) ensure that laws that confer discretionary
powers that have been exercised in a discriminatory fashion, but which lack
clear legislative statements authorizing the violation of Charter rights, are
placed back onto the legislative agenda. In the next section, we discuss the
civil and criminal remedies available to victims of profiling under sections
24(1) and 24(2). As we will explain, section 24 offers little in the way of
democratic accountability and does not guarantee effective remedies for
victims of profiling.
IV. SECTION 24 REMEDIES FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL
EXERCISES OF STATUTORY DISCRETION
A. Damages
After more than two decades of experience with the Charter, very
little can be said with confidence about the structure of the damage claim
under section 24(1). Basic matters still remain unsettled, such as the
appropriate defendant, whether statutes of limitations apply to Charter
damage claims,73 the extent to which governments are immune from
damage claims, whether fault independent of a violation of a Charter right
72 See Anthony J. Duggan & Kent Roach, "A Further Note on FinalNote: The Scope and Limits
of Judicial Law Making" (2001) 36 Can. Bus. L.J. 115 at 135-38.
73 For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal has held that statutes of limitations do not apply
to Charter damage claims, but this decision has not been followed by other courts of appeal (compare
Prete v. Ontario (Attorney-General) (1993), 110 D.L.R. (4th) 94 (O.C.A.), with McGillivary v. New
Brunswick (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th) 483 (N.B.C.A.), and Nag, v. Phillips (1996), 137 D.L.R. (4th) 715
(A.C.A.).
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must be established, and what, if any, damages are available for the
violation of a Charter right in the absence of consequential damages that
could be assessed under the common law. This uncertainty, as well as the
loser-pays-costs rule used in civil litigation, may well deter victims of
profiling from bringing civil actions. This would be unfortunate because it
would allow profiling that does not discover incriminating evidence to
remain a low visibility law enforcement practice not subject to legal
accountability.
In the context of a damages remedy for profiling, an important
preliminary consideration is the interrelationship between sections 24(1)
and 52(1). The Supreme Court has, in a number of cases, indicated that
damages as a remedy under section 24(1) may be difficult to obtain in
conjunction with a remedy under section 52(1), such as a declaration of
invalidity. Thus, in Schachter the Court declared that "[a]n individual
remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter will rarely be available in conjunction
with an action under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.""4 Four years later,
in Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney-General),75 the Court affirmed that, as a
general rule, section 24(1) damages could not be combined with a section
52(1) declaration. The Court noted that in the particular case before it, the
applicant had made "a bare allegation of unconstitutionality. The facts did
not warrant a departure from the general rule."76 In the recently decided
case of Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance)77, the Court once
again indicated that "as a rule, an action for damages brought under section
24(1) of the Charter cannot be combined with an action for a declaration
of invalidity based on s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982".78 The Court
stated that so long as the:
government and its representatives ... act in good faith and without abusing their power
under prevailing law and only subsequently are their acts found to be unconstitutional, they
will not be liable [for damages under s. 24(1)]. Otherwise, the effectiveness and efficiency
of government action would be excessively constrained. Laws must be given their full force
74 Supra note 70 at 720.
75 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347 [Guimond].
76 Ibid. at 360. Lower courts have also demonstrated reluctance to combine the two types of
remedies. See, for example, Walsh v. Bona (2000), 186 D.L.R. (4th) 50 at 84 (N.S.C.A.). But see Lucas
v. Toronto Police Service Board (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 783 (Ont. S.C.J.) (Lucas]. In Lucas, the court held
that the rule that damages and a constitutional declaration should not be issued together is "not an
absolute one. The general reason for the principle is that the state should not be retrospectively liable
for damages caused prior to the declaration of invalidity." But this rationale does not apply when
damages are sought for a prosecution under a law already declared unconstitutional.
77 (2002), 209 D.L.R. (4') 564 [Mackin].
78 Ibid. at 569.
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and effect as long as they are not declared invalid. Thus it is only in the event of conduct
that is clearly wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power that damages may be awarded. "'
Mackin appears to yield the following proposition: government and
its officials enjoy a robust good faith immunity from damage claims
provided that their acts are authorized by legislation that is found for the
first time to be unconstitutional in an action seeking both a remedy against
the legislation under section 52(1) and a damage remedy under section
24(1).
The Court's stance on the interrelationship between sections 24(1)
and 52(1) would be crucial in the context of a damages remedy for
profiling. The issue would be whether the unconstitutional practice was
authorized by law, and, if so, whether the Charter applicant was in effect
seeking to combine a section 52(1) remedy with the section 24 (1) damages
remedy. The government would have strong incentives to avail itself of
Mackin immunity. However, this argument raises a number of
complications. To invoke Mackin immunity, the government would have to
argue that profiling was authorized by law. But given that profiling would
likely occur through the exercise of statutory discretion, this would in turn
require the government to concede that, notwithstanding Slaight, the case
should nonetheless be handled under track 1 instead of track 2. In short,
asserting Mackin immunity in this context runs head on into Slaight, a case
that generally benefits governments, and which they may be reluctant to
circumvent. The central problem is the absence of a clear legislative
statement authorizing profiling by Bills C-36 and C-17 or any other
legislation of which we are aware. In our view, the absence of a specific
authorization should preclude the operation of Mackin immunity, because
the legislature has not addressed its mind to the issue of profiling, and as
a consequence could not have formed in good faith an opinion that
profiling is either necessary or justified under the Charter. Thus in our view,
the government and its officials should not enjoy the good faith immunity
contemplated in Mackin in any case involving a claim of profiling. They
should only be able to claim this immunity if Parliament actually made
clear statements authorizing profiling.
Without the sort of good faith immunity stemming from legislation
contemplated in Mackin, how should courts approach the issue of damages
for profiling? Courts would have to proceed from first principles. Section
24(1) contemplates a range of appropriate and just remedies, which should
79 Ibid. at 598-99. Justice Gonthier later seems to hint that negligence as well as abuse of power
might be sufficient for a damage award when he concludes, ibid. at 600, "1 do not find any evidence
that might suggest that the government of New Brunswick acted negligently, in bad faith or by abusing
its powers."
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in principle include damages. The ultimate issue should be what is required
to provide an appropriate and just remedy for a Charterviolation. It follows
that in order to vindicate the purposes of Charter rights and section 24(1),
there should be a role for Charter damages that is independent of the
common law. Moreover, there is no particular magic in governmental fault,
although it may influence what amount of damages is appropriate in the
circumstances. The causal connection between the violation and harm may
be relevant in determining what damages are just, but courts must not
ignore clear evidence that an individual's interaction with state officials was
tainted by profiling. Justice Wilson's dissent in McKinney may be an
appropriate starting point. Her dissent suggests that "[c]ompensation for
losses which flow as a direct result of the infringement of constitutional
rights should generally be awarded unless compelling reasons dictate
otherwise.""0
In many cases, compensatory damages arising from profiling might
be minimal. The indignity of being subjected to heightened investigative
scrutiny because of one's race, culture, or religion may be profound, but the
pecuniary damages may often be limited as the act of profiling may only
involve a few minutes of the target's time.8' David Rudovsky has
commented in the American context that "[a]bsent particularly harsh or
malicious conduct, the damages that flow from a relatively short stop and
incidental frisk or search, may appear to be nominal to some juries." 2
Larger awards and settlements have, however, been reached in some
American cases, particularly class actions, something which may now be an
option in a growing number of Canadian jurisdictions.8 3 If compensatory
damages are nil or minimal, courts will then be faced with the issue of how
to value a violation of a Charter right independent of any proven pecuniary
or compensatory damages. In other words, what is the conventional cost for
80 McKinney, supra note 54 at 410-11.
81At the same time, there may be some cases such as wrongful dismissals resulting from profiling
where pecuniary damages may be extensive.
82 David Rudovsky, "Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and
Stops and Searches without Cause" (2001) 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 296 at 354.
83 See Ptice v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2000), where $245,000 in damages was awarded
for racially motivated arrest and use of excessive force. See also, Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920 (1st Cir.
1987), where $375,000 in damages was awarded for racially motivated police misconduct. One famous
class action commenced by African-American lawyer Robert Wilkins, who was stopped on returning
from a family funeral, led to a settlement with the Maryland police that they not engage in profiling
and that they keep statistics concerning stops. These statistics indicated that 80 per cent of those
detained and searched were African-American or Hispanic. This result has led to fresh litigation. See
Maria V. Morris, "Racial Profiling and International Human Rights Law: Illegal Discrimination in the
United States" (2001) 15 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 207 at 239-40.
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violating a Charter right such as the right to equality?
The trend until quite recently was towards only awarding nominal
damages of about five hundred dollars for the violation of a Charter right.8 4
However, a more robust approach to conventional awards for violation of
Charter rights was recently taken inAuton (Guardian ad Litem of) v. British
Columbia (Attorney General),S5 in which the trial judge awarded a "symbolic
sum of damages of $20,000"86 to four successful petitioners who had
established that the government had violated the equality rights of their
autistic children. Justice Allan defended the damages on the basis that:
[t]hese relatively modest awards make no attempt to quantify any damages suffered by the
petitioners and do not reflect actual costs incurred for autism treatment to the infant
petitioners. They symbolize, in some tangible fashion, the fact that the petitioners have
achieved a real victory on behalf of all autistic children whose rights were infringed. A
symbolic figure also avoids an inquiry into what expenses the government would have
funded had it complied with its constitutional requirements to treat the infant petitioners'
disability.87
The damages were thus clearly conventional awards for the violation of the
Charter right and were not compensatory awards. At the same time, it must
be acknowledged that the damages were not a windfall to the successful
Charter applicants, who had spent much greater sums than twenty thousand
dollars in providing early treatment for their autistic children-treatment
that the court found that the children were constitutionally entitled to
under section 15 of the Charter. In another case in which a section 15
violation was established in a governmental hiring process, $7,5000 in
damages were awarded despite the absence of any evidence quantifying the
award or any actions justifying punitive damages.88 Ten thousand dollars in
"moral damages" were awarded by the Federal Court of Appeal for an
arrest by military police that was an unlawful and unjustified violation of
the applicant's rights, but resulted in no material damages or actions
justifying punitive damages.8 9 Justice Letourneau stressed that "financial
compensation for the moral injury sustained is the proper remedy in the
84 Crossman v. The Queen (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 588 at 600 (F.C.T.D.); Lord v. Allison (1986),
3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 300 at 316 (S.C.); Chrispen v. Kalinowski (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 176 at 191 (Sask.
Q.B.).
85 (2001), 197 D.L.R. (4th) 165 (B.C.S.C.).
8 6 Ibid. at 185.
8 7 Ibid. at 186.
88 Ayangma v. Prince Edward Island (2000), 194 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 254 at 290-91 (P.E.I.S.C.
(T.D.)).
8 9 Du-Lude v. Canada, [2001] 1 F.C. 545.
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circumstances" and indicated that "pre-Charter decisions are of limited use
and value" because of their age.9" Such meaningful conventional awards for
violations of Charter rights should be considered in the profiling context,
given both the societal and individual harm caused by the practice. Without
such conventional or even "symbolic" awards, it may be financially
irrational for individuals to seek damages as a remedy for profiling. Even
conventional awards in the range of $10,000 to &20,000 may not make such
litigation financially viable, especially if a successful litigant is only partially
indemnified with an award of party-and-party costs.9
Punitive damages may also be available in cases of profiling.92 It has
long been recognized that "if public officers will infringe men's rights, they
ought to pay greater damages than other men, to deter and hinder other
officers from the like offence"93 and that punitive damages can be justified
by "oppressive, arbitrary and unconstitutional conduct by the servants of
the government." 94 Punitive damages have been awarded under the Charter
with respect to assaults, and planned and deliberate Charter violations that
resulted in death. 9 The Supreme Court has indicated that exemplary
damages, which are specifically contemplated under the Quebec Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms,96 should only be awarded if the official acts
with "a state of mind that implies a desire or intent to cause the
consequences of his or her wrongful conduct" or "with full knowledge of
the immediate and natural or at least extremely probable consequences
that his or her conduct will cause."97 Although this is a restrictive test that
has been used to exclude exemplary damages stemming from "standard
9 0 Ibid. at 557-58.
91 In Mackin, supra note 77 at 600, the Supreme Court sounded a note of caution about awarding
the fuller indemnity of solicitor and client costs. See Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada
(Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2002 as updated) at para. 11.970 [Roach, Constitutional Remedies].
92 Punitive damages against municipalities are not allowed in the United States. For a persuasive
argument that such damages may best deter constitutional violations, see Ciraolo v. New York (City oJ)
216 F.3d 236 at 242-50 (2d Cir. 2000), Justice Calabresi concurring. See also Peter H. Schuck, Suing
Government: Citizen Remedies For Official Wrongs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). For the
Canadian context, see Lorne Sossin, "Crown Prosecutors and Constitutional Torts: The Promise and
Politics of Charter Damages" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 372.
93 Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Ld.Raym. 938 at 956.
94 Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 at 1226 (H.L.).
95 See Bauder v. Wilson (1988), 43 C.R.R. 149 (B.C.S.C.); Patenaude v. Roy (1994), 123 D.L.R.
(4th) 78 (Q.C.A.).
96 R.S.Q. c. C-12.
9 7 Quebec (Public Curator) v. Syndicat national des employgs de l'h6pital St-Ferdinand, [1996] 3
S.C.R. 211 at 262.
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police practice, ' it may nevertheless be satisfied in a profiling context
where it is clear that the officer intentionally singled a person out because
of her race or ethnicity.
In summary, damages may often be the only remedy available for
victims of profiling who do not face subsequent criminal or perhaps
administrative proceedings. Unfortunately, the availability of damage
awards remains unclear, with even recent cases suggesting that increased
quantums of conventional damage awards may not be enough to make such
litigation worthwhile. In addition, the government is likely to argue that it
and its officials enjoy the type of good faith immunity contemplated in
Mackin. But, as we have argued above, the better position is that the failure
of legislation to authorize profiling should deprive the government and its
officials of such a robust immunity. Because damages for profiling would
be a track 2 strategy, the restrictions on combining damages and section
52(1) remedies should not apply.
B. Injunctions and Declarations
With the possible exception of punitive damage awards, which may
be designed to deter similar violations in the future, the damage remedy
under section 24(1) of the Charter is mainly an individualistic and
compensatory remedy. Damages for profiling, particularly low awards that
are easily absorbed by the government or for which officials are
indemnified, may not change law enforcement behaviour in the future. The
question of ensuring future compliance with Charter standards will in many
cases be left to the court crafting declaratory or injunctive relief for
profiling. The current consensus is in favour of general declarations, so that
a Charter applicant who sought a systemic remedy against profiling in a law
enforcement agency would most likely receive a declaration that the agency
had engaged in profiling in the past and should not do so in the future, as
opposed to a more detailed mandatory order that could subsequently be
enforced through the court retaining jurisdiction and perhaps even using
its contempt powers to ensure compliance.99
98 Augustus v. Gosset, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 268 at 311.
99 Indeed, victims of profiling may receive more effective relief by making human rights
complaints against the officials who engaged in profiling. Human rights commissions may be more
prepared to order or negotiate settlements that result in complex mandatory relief. A recent human
rights complaint by African-Canadian law student Selwyn Pieters about profiling by the Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) resulted in a settlement that included not only an apology and
a cash payment of an undisclosed amount, but also commitments by the CCRA to "implement a pilot
project intended to develop statistics on referrals to secondary examination, based on race, colour,
national and ethnic origin and gender of referrals," to consider collecting such data on a permanent
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The Supreme Court's distinct preference for reliance on general
declaratory relief, as opposed to the detailed structural injunctions that
have been used in the United States in cases dealing with unconstitutional
conditions in various institutions including public schools, prisons, and
police forces, has been set out in a series of cases.Ut° In the equality rights
case of Eldridge v. British Columbia, the Court concluded that a
"declaration, as opposed to some kind of injunctive relief, is the
appropriate remedy in this case because there are myriad options available
to the government that may rectify the unconstitutionality of the current
system. It is not this Court's role to dictate how this is to be
accomplished."' O' In Little Sisters, a majority of the Court relied on a
declaration that customs officials had administered legislation in a manner
that had infringed freedom of expression and equality rights under the
Charter. Despite finding evidence that there had been improper targeting
of imports destined for the gay and lesbian book store and that customs
officials had insufficient resources and legal training, the majority of the
Court concluded, "with some hesitation, that it is not practicable" to order
"a more structured section 24(1) remedy."' 02 Although the Court did admit
that such a remedy may be "helpful," it held that the remedy was not
available in that particular case, because the appeal had taken six years and
there was no evidence as to the present state of customs enforcement, and
the applicant had not made precise remedial requests for structural relief.
But Little Sisters suggests that if a trial judge were faced with clear
evidence of systemic profiling, a structural injunction to prevent such
profiling might be appropriate and just. As Justice Iacobucci recognized in
his dissent in Little Sisters, declarations will be "simply inadequate" in those
cases where there are clear findings of grave systemic problems and
evidence that administrators "have proven themselves unworthy of trust."10 3
A declaration might also require victims of profiling to bear what Justice
basis, and to provide anti-racism and cultural diversity training for customs officers. See Minutes of
Settlement Between Selwyn Pieters and Department of National Revenue (now Canada Customs and
Revenue Agency), 30 January 2002 [unpublished]. Similar settlements and consent decrees have been
negotiated in the United States. See Rudovsky, supra note 82 at 359-63.
100 Even in the context of the explicitly positive rights to instruction and institutions under s. 23
of the Charter, the Supreme Court has stressed its preference for reliance on declaratory as opposed
to injunctive relief: Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342 at 392-93; Re Public Schools Act, [1993] 1
S.C.R. 839 at 860-61. This remedial consensus is explored in greater depth in Roach, "Remedial
Consensus and Dialogue", supra note 66.
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at 631.
102 Little Sisters, supra note 11 at 1203.
103 Ibid. at 1252.
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Iacobucci recognized as the "heavy" and "unfair ... burden ' '""a of
undergoing further expense and delay by starting new proceedings, should
the government continue to engage in an unconstitutional practice such as
profiling, as the Little Sisters bookstore now alleges." 5 An injunction, by
contrast, could be structured to respond to the systemic deficiencies that
produced profiling and to allow the judge to retain jurisdiction over the
institution until profiling has ceased.1 6 Both applicants and trial judges
would be well advised to propose and structure injunctive relief in a manner
that is clear, enforceable, and realistic, and does not simply repeat the
vague and often less than helpful edict to obey the Constitution or not to
engage in a violation of section 15 of the Charter. A robust section 24(1)
injunctive remedy might address systemic deficiencies in an organization
that has engaged in profiling. For example, an injunction could require law
enforcement officials to keep statistics to determine if profiling was
occurring, and to adopt a variety of educational and administrative
measures to help ensure that individual officials did not engage in profiling.
Structural injunctions are the strongest section 24(1) remedy, and they may
be justified to respond to an institution that has engaged in a pattern of
unconstitutional profiling.
But even the strongest possible section 24(1) remedy may fail to
promote democratic accountability for profiling. As discussed above, our
own preference would be for a section 52(1) declaration in cases where
there is a real risk that legislation will be enforced through profiling. The
Court in Little Sisters, however, refused to order a section 52(1) remedy or
an injunction enjoining the enforcement of customs legislation. Justice
Iacobucci in dissent seemed prepared to entertain structural relief under
section 24(1) because he feared that customs officials would continue to
engage in unconstitutional profiling. In the end, however, he relied on a
section 52(1) remedy that would have declared the authorizing customs
legislation to be invalid. Justice Iacobucci gave Parliament eighteen months
to reconsider the best procedure for ensuring that imported goods were not
obscene. The options open to Parliament included the creation of a
104 Ibid. at 1254.
105 Roach, "Remedial Consensus and Dialogue", supra note 66 at 233.
106 A less intrusive alternative would be for the court to issue declaratory relief but to retain
jurisdiction and allow or require the successful Charter applicant to return to the court to seek further
relief. A majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal recently held that this approach was unavailable
in a minority language education case under section 23 of the Charter, on the formalistic basis that the
trial judge had becomefunctus once he had issued the requested declaratory relief. Doucet-Boudreau
v. Nova Scotia (Dept. of Education) (2000), 185 N.S.R. (2d) 246 (T.D.), rev'd with respect to remedies
(2001), 203 D.L.R. (4th) 128 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 459
(QL).
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specialized tribunal and reliance on expost criminal prosecution after the
imported goods had been received in Canada. In the context of profiling,
such a remedial approach would promote a dialogue with Parliament about
the proper response to profiling. However, it would not necessarily provide
a tangible remedy for the victims and potential victims of such practices.
Another remedial issue is whether a victim or potential victim of
profiling could secure an interlocutory injunction or stay of the legislation
that could be used to engage in profiling. As with section 24(1) damages,
we believe that the failure of Bills C-36 or C-17 to explicitly authorize
explicitly or prohibit profiling would be significant to the choice of
remedies. A statutory ban on profiling would suggest that attempts to
obtain interlocutory relief against profiling were premature and that the
applicants might have adequate statutory or administrative remedies. On
the other hand, the failure of the legislation to authorize profiling suggests
that an interlocutory injunction against profiling, or perhaps even an
interlocutory stay of a particular statutory provision that is likely to be used
to engage in profiling, should be characterized as a less intrusive exemption
from the legislation as opposed to a more intrusive suspension of the
legislation. The exemption/suspension distinction in the jurisprudence of
interlocutory Charter remedies should be administered in a way that makes
it easier for vulnerable minorities to obtain such relief.10 7 It would be
inequitable to allow a government that refused to take responsibility for
authorizing profiling in legislation to then use a public interest defence for
profiling.
Two final issues that may arise in the context of civil remedies for
profiling are standing and ripeness. The United States Supreme Court has
taken a very restrictive approach to standing and held that a person who
suffered an unconstitutional chokehold by the police did not have standing
to request an injunction against the use of such chokeholds in the future
because it was not likely that he would suffer another chokehold from the
police. 08 Canadian courts should avoid such a restrictive approach,
especially given the clear availability of remedies under section 24(1) in
anticipation of Charter violations."l At the same time, however, Canadian
courts have insisted that a person requesting a remedy under section 24(1)
must have had his or her own rights violated. " Thus it is unclear whether
107 Roach, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 91 at para. 7.350.
108 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983).
109 See e.g. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R.
46 at 66.
110R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128.
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an organization would have standing under section 24(1) to seek an
injunction or a declaration that a practice of profiling was
unconstitutional."' 1 The possible refusal of standing under section 24(1) to
a public interest group representing those vulnerable to profiling also lends
support to our arguments that the most effective and democratic remedies
against profiling will be found under section 52(1). A public interest group
could more easily be granted discretionary public interest standing to
challenge the constitutionality of legislation that may authorize or fail to
prohibit profiling.1
1 2
C. Criminal Law Remedies: Exclusion of Evidence and Stays of
Proceedings
Although the focus of this section has been on civil challenges to
profiling, a few comments about the criminal law remedies that are
available for profiling are relevant. A person who has been subject to
profiling that has resulted in a criminal charge may have a greater chance
at receiving a tangible remedy than one who faces no criminal
proceedings." 3 Legal aid may often be available to assist in the defence and
the accused can argue that the violation of her Charter rights requires the
exclusion of incriminating evidence under section 24(2), or even a stay of
proceedings under section 24(1). In both cases, courts will examine the
entire transaction resulting in the accused's prosecution. Thus,
incriminating evidence may be obtained in a manner that violates the
Charter and be subject to exclusion under section 24(2), even in the absence
of a direct causal connection between the act of profiling and the discovery
of the evidence.' 14 Similarly, courts routinely examine all the circumstances
At the same time, even American courts have found that organizations such as the NAACP
may have standing to challenge profiling on the basis that the rights of their members would be
infringed by such practices. See Maryland Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland Dept. of State
Police, 72 F.Supp. 2d 560 (D.Md. 1999); Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F.Supp. 2d 1131
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
1 12 Courts should consider the difficulties that individuals would face bringing Charter challenges
to profiling and should not mechanically deny public interest standing to a group on the basis that
more directly affected individual victims of profiling could bring a challenge. But see Canadian Council
of Churches v. Canada (Ministry of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236.
113 The same cannot be said of those who face subsequent administrative proceedings, because
administrative boards and tribunals may be found not to have jurisdiction to exclude unconstitutionally
obtained evidence. See Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75.
114 R v. Strachan [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980; R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223. There may be some limits
if the relation between the impugned evidence and the Charte violation is remote and tenuous. R. v.
Goldhart, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 463.
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of an investigation and a prosecution in determining whether a stay of
proceedings is appropriate and just.
Although the criminal courts are not likely to ignore an established
Charter violation stemming from profiling, it would be a serious mistake to
assume that in every case they will exclude evidence or stay proceedings.
Evidence obtained in a manner that involves profiling may well be evidence
that is not conscripted..5 directly from the accused but found by the
authorities without the accused's assistance. In such cases of non-
conscriptive evidence, the courts will only exclude the evidence after
balancing the seriousness of the Charter violation against the harms of
excluding the evidence as measured by its importance to the case and the
seriousness of the offence charged. The seriousness of the violation often
depends on whether the court finds that it was committed in a deliberate
or flagrant manner. Even then, however, courts consider most offences, and
certainly terrorism offences, to be serious. Much will depend on the court's
perceptions of the relative harms of profiling and terrorism. Although some
courts have excluded narcotic evidence possibly obtained through
profiling,1 6 it is not clear that the same will occur in the terrorism context.
The chance of obtaining a stay of proceedings under section 24(1)
because of profiling is even slimmer than that of obtaining the exclusion of
non-conscriptive evidence. In such cases, as under section 24(2), the
Supreme Court is primarily concerned with whether refusing to stay
proceedings will result in an unfair trial or a continuing abuse of process
that will bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Most acts of
profiling will not in themselves affect the fairness of the trial. Thus the issue
is whether a stay will be required to prevent a continued abuse of authority.
The Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to sanction stays of
proceedings in this context, indicating that only "in 'exceptional', 'relatively
very rare' cases will the past misconduct be 'so egregious that the mere fact
of going forward in the light of it will be offensive."" 7 Even then a stay
should not be ordered until the seriousness of the offence charged has been
considered.!18 The availability of less drastic remedies, such as a subsequent
damage action against the government, must also be considered. Even a
criminal accused who has established a Charter violation in relation to
115 If the evidence is a statement or bodily substance conscripted from the accused, it will be
excluded to protect the accused's fair trial, with little consideration of the seriousness of the Charter
violation: R v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607.
116 v. Simpson (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 182 (C.A.).
117 R. v. Regan (2002), 209 D.L.R. (4th) 41 at 67.
118 Ibid. at 91, 94.
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profiling may not receive a tangible remedy at her criminal trial in the form
of the exclusion of evidence or a stay of proceedings. This underlines for us
the limited efficacy of section 24(1) remedies as presently conceived by the
courts and the attendant need to focus on section 52(1) remedies.
V. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A CLEAR LEGISLATIVE
STATEMENT BY PARLIAMENT ON PROFILING
Although profiling has been advocated as a tool to detect and
prevent terrorist acts, it is a practice that at present lacks explicit statutory
authorization. However, this does not mean that it is illegal. Rather, the
statutory silence on profiling, both in Canada's legislative response to
September 11, as well as in pre-September 11 legislation, means that
profiling would be achieved through exercises of statutory discretion,
outside the glare of public scrutiny and democratic debate. In this article,
we argue that the current framework of Charter jurisprudence creates the
perverse incentive for governments to implement constitutionally
controversial policies in secret through sub-legal means, because of the
interrelationship between the "prescribed by law" requirement under
section one and the remedies available for unjustified violations of Charter
rights. Charter violations that can be traced to legislation trigger the
operation of section 52(1) (track 1) and hence are forced onto the
legislative agenda. By contrast, violations that terminate in the actions of
individual agents of the state, even when they exercise a discretion granted
by statute, engage section 24 (track 2). We have also argued that section 24
remedies in this context are doubly flawed. First, they are less able to force
democratic debate on limitations of constitutional rights than are
declarations of invalidity under section 52(1). Second, they are ineffective.
In particular, section 24 remedies will benefit the factually guilty more than
innocent victims of profiling. Also, Canadian courts do not have much
experience with the large damage awards or supervised relief that would
place pressure on law enforcement agencies to take active steps to prevent
profiling. Put another way, forcing litigants onto track 2 denies them a
political remedy for violations of Charter rights and gives them legal
remedies that are not up to the task.
Because the Charter is an integral component of a liberal
democratic constitutional order, it should be interpreted to ensure that
important public policies that implicate our fundamental constitutional
values are deliberated and decided upon in public by legislatures, even
before they come before the courts. In short, we are talking about nothing
less than legislative oversight for Charter compliance, not just after
legislation is found constitutionally wanting by the courts (through reply
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legislation), but also during the framing of legislation itself. The legal tool
through which this can be achieved is the requirement that limits on Charter
rights be "prescribed by law." Our proposal is that in the context of
profiling and other activities that present a clear danger to Charter rights,
courts require that exercises of statutory discretion have a mandate to limit
Charter rights that is explicit or which arises by necessary implication from
the legislation. In this way, the forms of law would strengthen the direction
and depth of democratic debate. To do otherwise would punish the
politically powerless twice-first, by omitting effective constraints on
discretionary decision making in the legislation itself, and second, after
their rights have been violated, by denying them access to a political
remedy. In the context of Bill C-36, the failure of groups representing
Muslim and Arab Canadians to secure amendments that would have
banned profiling makes it all the more important that constitutional
litigation operate to correct, rather than compound, deficiencies in the
political process.
If government agencies engage in profiling in the war on terror, the
courts should find the statute that confers the discretion to engage in
profiling to be unconstitutional. The appropriate remedy would be a
declaration of invalidity under section 52(1), perhaps accompanied by a
delay that would allow the law to remain in place for legitimate law
enforcement activity but not unconstitutional profiling. At that point,
Parliament would have a choice- it could explicitly authorize profiling or
explicitly ban it. Whatever Parliament would do, it would be obliged to
employ a clear statement, as opposed to punting the issue to the executive.
Parliament would have to take a stand on whether it was for or against
profiling.
Some argue that our preference for provoking a democratic debate
on profiling, as well as for theories of judicial review which promote
dialogue between courts and legislatures, leaves vulnerable minorities at
risk.n 9 To be sure, profiling has its supporters, particularly in the
conservative press. And we are saddened that the majority of legal scholars
who made submissions to the House and Senate Committees in Parliament
did not address racial and ethnic profiling, which in our view is one of the
gravest threats to Charter rights posed by the war on terror. 120 Nevertheless,
119 See Jean Lelair, "Rrflexions critiques au sujet de la mrtaphore du dialogue en droit
constitutionnel canadien" Revue du Barreau [forthcoming in 2003].
120 Of the dozen legal scholars who testified before the House of Commons Standing Committee
on Justice and Human Rights, and the Senate Special Committee on Bill C-36, the hearing transcripts
show that only three squarely addressed racial and ethnic profiling in their oral testimony, with a fourth
discussing the overlapping, but distinct, phenomenon of ideological profiling: Errol Mendes (Special
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given the multiracial, multi-ethnic, and multicultural nation that Canada
has become, we very much doubt that an express policy of profiling could
withstand the scrutiny of legislative and public debate. 1' Canada is now a
very different country than when it turned against its residents of Japanese
descent.
Our strong sense is that no government would be willing to
withstand the political controversy that would be generated by explicit
legislative authorization of racial or ethnic profiling. Perhaps for that
reason, the government has chosen to duck the issue such that profiling
remains neither authorized nor prohibited by legislation enacted by
Parliament. For example, in our brief to the Special Senate Committee on
Bill C-36, we proposed a Cr0minal Code amendment that would have
banned profiling by law enforcement officials.1 22 While the government did
not accept this amendment, it did not use this opportunity to come out in
favour of profiling, thereby refusing to address the issue head on. Should
profiling take place, we hope that constitutional litigation would require the
government and Parliament to confront an issue of profiling they have thus
far avoided. Parliament would have a choice of explicitly authorizing and
accepting democratic responsibility for profiling," or, preferably, adopting
a statutory ban on this discriminatory law enforcement practice. Either way,
profiling would no longer be allowed to remain underground. In our view,
democracy requires no less.
Senate Committee on Bill C-36, Proceedings, Issue 8 (5 December 2001), online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/sm36-e/O8eva
e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses= l&comm id=90>, House of Commons, Standing Committee
on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence (6 November 2001), online: Parliamentary Internet
< http:/Avww.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/l/JUST/Meetings/Evidence/ ustev44-e.htm >(racial profiling)),
Don Stuart (Special Senate Committee on Bill C-36, Proceedings, Issue 8 (5 December 2001), online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/sm36-e/O8evb-
e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses= 1&comm id=90>(racial profiling); Kent Roach, ibid. (racial
profiling), and Jamie Cameron (House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human
Rights, Evidence (6 November 2001), online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/1/JUST/Meetings/Evidence/ustev44-e.htm>(ideological
profiling)).
121 For example, Herb Dhaliwal (then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, now Minister of Natural
Resources) having once been profiled himself, denounced the practice during the debates leading to
the enactment of Bill C-36. See Choudhry, supra note 2 at 368 and Kent Roach, September 11
Consequences for Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003) at 64-66, 70-74.
122 Kent Roach & Sujii Choudhry, "Brief to the Special Senate Committee on Bill C-36" (5
December 2001) [unpublished]. This brief was excerpted by The Toronto Star (6 December 2001) A36.
123 If our views that profiling violates the equality rights of the racial and ethnic groups targeted
and cannot be justified under section 1 as an effective and proportionate law enforcement technique
are accepted, explicit authorization of profiling would require that the legislation be enacted
notwithstanding section 15 of the Charter.
